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Abstract—Deep learning (DL), despite its enormous success
in many computer vision and language processing applications,
is exceedingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We consider
the use of DL for radio signal (modulation) classification tasks,
and present practical methods for the crafting of white-box and
universal black-box adversarial attacks in that application. We
show that these attacks can considerably reduce the classification
performance, with extremely small perturbations of the input.
In particular, these attacks are significantly more powerful than
classical jamming attacks, which raises significant security and
robustness concerns in the use of DL-based algorithms for the
wireless physical layer.
Index Terms—Adversarial attacks, Deep learning, Wireless
security, Modulation classification, Neural networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL), implemented through deep neural net-
works (DNNs), represents a machine-learning paradigm that
has been extremely successful in the last decade, especially in
computer vision and natural language processing applications
[1]. This revolution has also sparked interest in applying
DL in many other disciplines, including algorithm design
for wireless communication systems [2]–[6]. For example,
[3] uses a convolutional neural network (CNN) for channel
decoding, [4] studies DL-based wireless resource allocation,
and [5], [6] use DL for the classical task of radio signal
(modulation) classification. Promising performance have been
achieved by DL-methods in these applications.
It has been shown that DNNs are highly vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples, which raises major security and robustness
concerns [7]. Adversarial examples are malicious inputs that
are obtained by slightly perturbing an original input, in such a
way that the DL algorithm misclassifies them [7], [8]. These
perturbations are not “random white noise”, but rather well-
sought directions in the feature space that cause erroneous
model outputs.
In this paper, we consider the use of DL algorithms applied
to the radio signal (modulation) classification problem of [5],
and show that this class of algorithms is extremely vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. For the sake of reproducibility and
cultivation of future research on this topic, we use the publicly
available GNU radio machine learning dataset of [9]. Our
specific contributions are as follows. First, we present a new al-
gorithm for generation of fine-grained white-box input-specific
adversarial attacks. Second, we propose a computationally
efficient algorithm for crafting white-box universal adversarial
perturbations (UAP). Third, we show how one can create
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black-box UAP attacks. Fourth, we reveal the shift invariant
property of UAPs.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
We denote a DNN classifier by f(.;θ) : X → RC , where θ
is the set of model parameters, X ⊂ Rp is the input domain
with p being the dimension of the inputs, and C is the number
of classes.1 For every input x ∈ X the classifier assigns a label
lˆ(x,θ) = argmaxk fk(x,θ) where fk(x,θ) is the output of
f corresponding to the kth class. Given these definitions, the
adversarial perturbation for input x and classifier f is denoted
by rx and is obtained as follows [7]
argmin
rx
‖rx‖2 (1)
s.t. lˆ(x,θ) 6= lˆ(x + rx,θ) and x + rx ∈ X .
Note that rx might not be unique and we might use other
norms, e.g., infinity norm. In the context of wireless commu-
nication, the l2-norm is a natural choice as it accounts for the
perturbation power.
In practice solving (1) is difficult, hence different sub-
optimal methods have been proposed to approximate the
adversarial perturbation [7], [8]. Among these methods, the
class of fast gradient methods (FGM) is a commonly used
approach [8]. They provide computationally efficient methods
for crafting adversarial examples, at the cost of coarse-grained
perturbations [7]. Denoting the loss function of the model
by L(θ,x,y), where y ∈ {0, 1}C is the label vector, FGM
linearizes the loss function in a neighborhood of x, and then
optimizes this linearized function. There are two variants of
FGM, targeted FGM and non-targeted FGM.
In a targeted FGM attack, the adversary is searching for a
perturbation that causes the classifier to have a specific mis-
classification, e.g., the classifier classifies QPSK modulation
as AM-DSB modulation. Therefore, denoting the one-hot en-
coded desired target class as ytarget, in targeted FGM we want
to minimize L(θ,x + rx,ytarget) with respect to rx. Hence,
FGM linearizes the loss function as L(θ,x+ rx,ytarget) ≈
L(θ,x,ytarget)+ rTx∇xL(θ,x,ytarget) and then minimizes it by
setting rx = −α ∇xL(θ,x,ytarget), where α is a scaling factor
to adjust the adversarial perturbation power.
In a non-targeted FGM attack, the adversary is searching
for a perturbation that causes any misclassification, i.e. the
adversary is not interested in a specific misclassification and
any misclassification is allowed. In a non-targeted FGM attack
the loss is L(θ,x + rx,ytrue) where ytrue is the true label
1Notations: Scalars are denoted by lower case letters whereas boldface
lower (upper) case letters are used for vectors (matrices). We denote by IN
the identity matrix of size N and represent the n column of IN as en.
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Fig. 1: An illustration of VT-CNN2 of [9].
of x. FGM linearizes the loss as L(θ,x + rx,ytrue) ≈
L(θ,x,ytrue)+ rTx∇xL(θ,x,ytrue) and then maximizes it by
setting rx = α ∇xL(θ,x,ytrue).
Besides the targeted and non-targeted categories, the ad-
versarial attacks can be categorized along other dimensions
[7], [8]. The adversarial attacks can be divided into white-box
and black-box attacks, based on the amount of knowledge that
the adversary has about the model. In white-box attacks, the
adversary has the full knowledge of the classifier, while in
black-box attacks the adversary does not have any knowledge
(or has limited knowledge) of the classifier. Adversarial attacks
can also be classified based on their scope to the individual
or universal attacks, which will be detailed in Section V.
III. THE GNU RADIO ML DATASET AND ITS DNN
To study the robustness and security issues of DL-based
wireless systems, we will use the GNU radio ML dataset
RML2016.10a [9] and its associated DNN [5]. The main
reason behind this choice is that the dataset and the source
code for its associated DNN classifier [9] are publicly available
at [10].
The GNU radio ML dataset RML2016.10a contains 220000
input samples, where each sample is associated with one
specific modulation scheme at a specific signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). It contains 11 different modulations, which are BPSK,
QPSK, 8PSK, QAM16, QAM64, CPFSK, GFSK, PAM4,
WBFM, AM-SSB, and AM-DSB. The samples are generated
for 20 different SNR levels from −20 dB to 18 dB with a
step of 2 dB. Each sample input is a vector of size 256, which
corresponds to 128 in-phase and 128 quadrature components.
Half of the samples are considered as the training set and
the other half as the test set. [9] uses a deep CNN classifier
named as VT-CNN2. The structure of VT-CNN2 is illustrated
in Fig. 1, following TensorFlow’s default format for data, i.e.,
(height, width, channels). We use this network in our analysis.
IV. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS FOR DL-BASED
MODULATION CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we develop a white-box adversarial attack
on DL-based modulation classification, using VT-CNN2 as the
classifier. (A black-box attack is devised in Section V.) In a
wireless system, when the attacker is absent, the receiver (RX)
receives a wireless signal from one (or multiple) legitimate
transmitter (TX), which is denoted by x. But when the attacker
is present, it also transmits a signal to create a low power
perturbation rx at the RX. Therefore, the RX will receive
xadv = x + rx. The attacker target is to design rx such that
it causes misclassification for the underlying DNN at the RX
side.
To design an adversarial perturbation rx for a given input
x, we start with the white-box attack for simplicity. Later in
Section V, we extend the attack to more general cases. FGMs
are computationally efficient methods for crafting adversarial
perturbations, but they provide coarse-grained perturbations
and also have a low success rate for fooling the classifier.
Therefore, we present Alg. 1 to address these issues.
Algorithm 1 Crafting an adversarial example
Inputs:
• input x and its label ltrue
• the model f(.,θ)
• desired perturbation accuracy εacc
• maximum allowed perturbation norm pmax
Output: adversarial perturbation of the input, i.e., rx
1: Initialize: ε← 0C×1
2: for class-index in range(C) do
3: εmax ← pmax, εmin ← 0
4: rnorm = (‖∇xL(x, eclass-index)‖2)−1∇xL(x, eclass-index)
5: while εmax − εmin > εacc do
6: εave ← (εmax + εmin)/2
7: xadv ← x− εave rnorm
8: if lˆ(xadv) == ltrue then
9: εmin ← εave
10: else
11: εmax ← εave
12: end if
13: end while
14: [ε]class-index = εmax
15: end for
16: target-class = argmin ε and ε∗ = min ε
17: rx = − ε
∗
‖∇xL(x, etarget-class)‖2∇xL(x, etarget-class)
Alg. 1 improves two specific drawbacks of FGM. First,
FGM is designed to set the scaling factor of the perturbation,
i.e., α, such that it goes all the way to the edge of a norm ball
surrounding the input [8]. However, Alg. 1 uses a bisection
search to find the exact value of scaling factor that guarantees
the misclassification (within the extent of the constraint on the
perturbation norm). Second, in a non-targeted FGM attack,
FGM tries to increase L(θ,x+rx,ytrue), and for a targeted
attack FGM tries to minimize L(θ,x+rx,ytarget) just for a
specific target class. On the contrary, Alg. 1 searches among all
possible targeted attacks and then select the one with the least
perturbation required to enforce misclassification. Therefore,
Alg. 1 provides fine-grained adversarial perturbations while
relying on the computationally efficient FGM as the core of
the algorithm.
In the computer vision literature on adversarial attacks,
the focus is on finding slight perturbations that a human
observer does not even notice, while it causes misclassifi-
cation. Given Alg. 1, one can think of a similar analogy
in wireless applications, perturbations which are unnoticeable
(or quasi-unnoticeable) by the receiver. Here we propose two
new metrics, the perturbation-to-noise ratio (PNR) and the
perturbation-to-signal ratio (PSR), where PNR is the ratio of
the perturbation power to the noise power and PSR is the
ratio of the perturbation power to the signal power. Note that
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Fig. 2: The accuracy of VT-CNN2 versus PNR, with and
without adversarial attack.
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is related to PSR and PNR as
PNR = PSR× SNR or equivalently PNR [dB] = PSR [dB]+
SNR [dB]. Given these definitions, we can consider a pertur-
bation (quasi) imperceptible if for that perturbation we have
PNR ≤ 1, as the perturbation will be in the same order or
even below the noise level.
Fig. 2 presents the accuracy of VT-CNN2 versus PNR,
for three different values of SNR. The perturbations are
created using Alg. 1. The horizontal dashed lines represent the
accuracy of VT-CNN2 when there is no attack. From Fig. 2,
it is obvious that when the perturbation is in the same order
as the noise (for all three SNR levels), the attack can cause
100% misclassification. Note that, even when the perturbation
is one or several orders of magnitude less than the noise level,
the attack can significantly reduce the accuracy of the model.
This raises a major concern regarding the robustness of DL-
based wireless application and reveals their vulnerability to
white-box adversarial attacks.
V. UNIVERSAL BLACK-BOX ATTACKS FOR WIRELESS
COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
In the previous section, we presented a white-box attack
while considering three limiting assumptions. First, the at-
tacker knows the exact input. Second, each element of x
is perturbed by its corresponding element in rx, i.e., the
attacker is synchronous with the transmitter. Third, as we
considered a white-box attack, we assumed the attacker has
a perfect knowledge of the underlying model, i.e., f(.;θ). In
this section, we address these limiting assumptions.
A. Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Alg. 1 creates input-dependent adversarial perturbations,
i.e., given input x it generates a perturbation rx to fool the
model. This enforces the attacker to know the input of the
model, which is not a practical assumption. Therefore, it
is interesting to create adversarial attacks which are input-
agnostic. More precisely, instead of rx, we are interested to
find a universal adversarial perturbation r that can fool the
model with high probability, independent of the input applied
to the model. In the literature on ML and computer vision,
such a perturbation is called a UAP [11].
A common method for creating UAP is presented in [11].
The algorithm therein, receives as inputs, 1) the model, 2)
the desired norm of the UAP, and 3) a random subset of
data inputs, e.g., {x1, . . . ,xN}. Based on these inputs, it
generates as output a UAP r. The core of the algorithm is an
iterative approach that in each iteration requires to generate
an adversarial perturbation for each of the N data points,
e.g., by running Alg. 1 N times. Hence, it is computationally
expensive.
In this section, we propose a new algorithm for gener-
ating a UAP that has a very low computational complex-
ity and also provides a better fooling rate on our dataset
compared to [11]. The algorithm uses principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) to craft the UAP. The main intuition
behind the algorithm is as follows. Assume we have an
arbitrary subset of inputs {x1, . . . ,xN}, and their associ-
ated perturbation directions {nx1 , . . . ,nxN }, where nxi =
∇xiL(θ,xi,ytrue)/‖∇xiL(θ,xi,ytrue)‖2. Now the question is,
how one can craft a UAP r that contains the common
characteristic(s) of {nx1 , . . . ,nxN }? Noting that nx1 to nxN
are points in Rp, if we stack them into a matrix, then the
first principal component of the matrix would have the largest
variance. In other words, the first principal component will
account for as much as variability in {nx1 , . . . ,nxN } as
possible. Therefore, we suggest using the direction of the first
principal component as the direction of UAP. The detailed
algorithm is given in Alg. 2.
Algorithm 2 PCA-based approach for crafting a UAP
Inputs:
• a random subset of input data points {x1, . . . ,xN}
and their corresponding labels
• the model f(.,θ)
• maximum allowed perturbation norm pmax
Output: a UAP r
1: Evaluate XN×p = [nx1 , . . . ,nxN ]
T .
2: Compute the first principal direction of X and denote it
by v1, i.e., X = UΣVT and v1 = V e1.
3: r = pmaxv1.
Fig. 3 investigates the performance of Alg. 2. It illustrates
the accuracy of VT-CNN2 versus PSR, for our proposed UAP
attack, the UAP attack presented in [11], and a jamming attack.
For the jamming attack, the adversary creates Gaussian noise,
which has the same mean as the data points and same power
as the UAP attacks. Note that Alg. 2 provides higher fooling
rate than [11]. Moreover, even for very small PSR values
the performance of VT-CNN2 drops significantly, e.g., for
PSR= −10 dB the accuracy drops by half. Also note that the
proposed UAP is significantly more powerful than the classical
jamming attack.
To emphasize the low computational cost of Alg. 2, we
also present Table I, which compares the run-time of Alg. 2
with [11] in seconds, for SNR= 10 dB and N = 50. All the
simulations are performed using TensorFlow on an NVIDIA
GeForce GTX 1080 Ti graphic processing unit. Note that [11]
4PSR [dB] -10 -12 -14 -16 -18 -20
Time required by [11] 20.5 23.0 25.1 27.2 29.0 30.5
Time required by Alg. 2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
TABLE I: Run time of Alg. 2 compared to [11] in seconds,
for SNR= 10 dB and N = 50.
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Fig. 3: The accuracy of VT-CNN2 under different attacks.
requires much more time to craft a UAP as PSR reduces,
while Alg. 2 provides a steady and efficient computational
performance.
B. Black-Box Attacks and Shift Invariant Property of UAPs
In the previous subsection, 1) we assumed the attacker
has the perfect knowledge of the model f(.,θ), 2) and it is
synchronous with the transmitter, i.e., each element of x to be
perturbed by its corresponding element in r. In the following,
we show how an attacker can address these two limitations.
To address the first problem we use the transferability prop-
erty of adversarial examples [8]. Due to this property, an adver-
sarial example crafted for a specific DNN can also fool other
DNNs with different architectures, with high probability [8].
Therefore, to craft a UAP for VT-CNN2, we first create such
a UAP for a substitute DNN and then apply it on VT-CNN2.
Here we consider a 256−1024−1024−1024−512−128−11
fully connected multilayer perceptron (MLP) as our substitute
DNN and craft a UAP for it.
To address the second problem, we reveal an interesting
property of the crafted UAPs, namely, the shift invariant
property. More precisely, we show that the UAPs created by
Alg. 2 are shift invariant, i.e, any circularly shifted version of
them can fool the DNN and cause misclassification.
Fig. 4 shows the performance of two UAP attacks designed
using Alg. 2, a white-box UAP attack that has the perfect
knowledge of the model, and a black-box UAP attack with
random shifts. For the latter case the UAP is crafted for the
aforementioned substitute MLP (black-box attack) and then
the UAP is randomly shifted (non-synchronous attack). Given
Fig. 4, note the following observations. First, the black-box
attack is approximately as effective as the white-box attack.
Second, any random shifted version of the UAP is nearly as
destructive as the original synchronous version, hence there
is no need for a synchronous attack. Therefore, Fig. 4 shows
that we are able to craft extremely low power UAPs that can
cause severe misclassification, while we neither need to know
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Fig. 4: An illustration of transferability and shift invariant
properties of the proposed UAP attack.
the model of the underlying DNN, nor require a synchronous
attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
We considered the use of DL-based algorithms for radio
signal classification and showed that these algorithms are
extremely susceptible to adversarial attacks. Specifically we
designed white-box and black-box attacks on a DL classifier
and demonstrated their effectiveness. Significantly less trans-
mit power is required by the attacker in order to cause misclas-
sification, as compared to the case of conventional jamming
(where the attacker transmits only random noise). This exposes
a fundamental vulnerability of DL-based solutions.
Given the openness (broadcast nature) of the wireless trans-
mission medium, we conjecture that other DL-based signal
processing algorithms for the wireless physical layer may
suffer from the same security problem.
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